Manuel Vides: Is there a new world order?
PIVOTING BETWEEN MAJOR GLOBAL PLAYERS
Rapid economic change and the political rise of new players on the international stage over the first two decades of the 21st century have prompted commentators to ponder the possibility of a global power shift.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States was left almost undisputed as the leading power in an international order based on the free market and democracy, both of which were bolstered by the process of globalisation. However, the Asia-Pacific region has started to play a larger role in international affairs, with countries positioning themselves as emerging actors in a regional scenario with ever greater global impact, due to the weakening of the pillars of the international order erected by the United States: the economic disruption caused by the financial crisis of 2008 and the echoes of isolationism have undermined Washington’s position in a region that has grown stronger through internally driven economic growth and intra-regional cooperation.
The Asia-Pacific region is a key driver of the global economy. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the post-pandemic recovery period has shown that, whilst Europe and North America have grown by an average of 2.8% and 3.2%, this region has grown by 5%.
This economic impetus stems from diversification of the region’s portfolio in raw materials and technology, where production costs are comparatively lower than in the United States or the European Union. Asia-Pacific not only offers the benefits of near-shoring, but also enjoys a stable market due to its integrated commercial infrastructure, as well as its geographical distance from hot conflict zones such as Ukraine and the Middle East.
However, this new standing is also the result of the balance in the trade alliances between a regional actor such as China and an actor outside the region, such as the United States. For Asia-Pacific, trade is a vital regional interest that it seeks to protect from the contingencies of international politics. This explains why countries in the region have cultivated their trading ties within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), promoted by Beijing, and also the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), which was launched by Washington. Faced with rival powers on either side, the region has opted for a pragmatic approach, so as not to jeopardise its main asset, economic growth. In keeping with this, Asia-Pacific has sought to exploit the comparative advantages of both trade agreements: while the RCEP provides access to a market with tariff reductions of close to 90% and rules for e-commerce, the IPEF seeks to curtail the predominance of imports and investment by Chinese state corporations in the economies of the regional members.
“It is difficult to point to the emergence of a new international order when the two geopolitical powers (China and the USA) are evenly balanced.”
Nonetheless, this great strategic interest in the region is not untouched by international geopolitical considerations. The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership (TPP) under the Trump administration was a window of opportunity for China to develop the RCEP and to increase its soft influence among Washington’s traditional allies in the region, such as Australia, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand.
The US response under the Biden administration has been to promote economic and security cooperation more widely in the region and to seek to balance China’s power by including India, one of the Pacific region’s rising economies. The inclusion of New Delhi in the architecture proposed by the United States for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), alongside Australia and Japan, shows that Washington’s strategy is to contain an economically powerful China by means of a regional security cordon, which serves as a deterrent.
Asia-Pacific has accordingly emerged as a region of geopolitical rivalries of strategic importance. The region has developed more complex ties with both rival global players as a means of ensuring the region’s survival. As a result, pivoting is the rule: whilst it enjoys the economic benefits of Beijing’s “Globalisation without standards”, the region holds on to the security advantages of its alliance with Washington, as a guarantee of international stability that enables it to continue to profit from trading around the Pacific. It is therefore difficult to point to the emergence of a new international order (including at regional level) when the two geopolitical powers are evenly balanced. But it is significant that the Asia-Pacific Region retains its strategic autonomy while contributing through its behaviour to the rivalry between China and the United States.
