Raquel Vaz-Pinto: Is there a new world order?
PORTUGAL, THE ATLANTIC AND THE WORLD IN TRANSITION
Let’s start with an answer to an apparently trivial and elementary question: Is there a de facto new world order? The answer is simple: no, there isn’t. Why is this so?
Firstly, a glance at international news gives us a picture of a world that is changing and, in some parts, at a very fast pace. The United States of America (US) remains THE superpower, albeit with manifest limits and challenges. One of these is painfully obvious: we now question the stability of the US liberal democracy. In point of fact, we have been watching the presidential race to the White House as if it were our own. At the same time, these limits and challenges are not the same as unequivocally stating that the superpower is in decline, leading to the loss of global hegemony. On the contrary, Washington has been able to demonstrate an ability to adapt and a flexible approach to its many problems.
Furthermore, irrespective of who is occupying the Oval Office in the White House, there is a reality that we must all accept: US society and electoral dynamics have changed. It is now keener on “de-globalisation“ or “re-industrialisation“ and is also committed to looking at China, as the 2022 National Security Strategy puts it, as a “strategic rival”. These changes are reflected in both political parties and not just the usual suspects, namely, the Republicans. We don’t need to go further than President Biden’s legislation protecting strategic sectors and the incentives for industrial production within the US regarding, for instance, semiconductors. The same goes for critical raw materials, where the emphasis is on “diversification” and “de-risking”, following the European Union (EU) “Critical Raw Materials Act” of 2023. But protecting them from what? The answer is obvious, and it points to China.
“It is in the national interest of countries to develop, extend and diversify their foreign relations.”
Secondly, there is talk of China as the next superpower. Recent decades have been remarkable in and for China, but the former Middle Kingdom is still far from such a goal. In my view, the internal challenges ranging from demographics to economics are the main hurdles for such a global status. Nevertheless, Beijing has clearly put a strategy into practice, perhaps best demonstrated by the Belt and Road Initiative, and is now competing with US influence in many regions in the world.
In the case of the African continent, China has outmanoeuvred all other foreign powers. This assertiveness has prompted the US to develop a more active strategy best highlighted in the “Indo-Pacific”. The kick-off was made by Japan and solidified by the US, and it includes such key actors as India, Australia and South Korea.
In 2024, we are not in a de facto new world order, but we are in transition to something. Will it be a bipolar rivalry led by Washington and Beijing? Will there be more global powers? At this point in time, I honestly don’t know what the next world order will look like. What I do know for sure is that the rivalry between the US and China is here to stay and it will be reinforced on both sides.
And this leads me to the second part of this article: Considering the above outline of international politics, how can a country with an Atlantic tradition such as Portugal thrive?
Firstly, we should be prudent regarding generalisations, such as the terminal decline of the US or the rise of China to superpower status. Being prudent means being realistic about international politics and preparing ourselves for the uncertainty that characterises these phases of global transition.
Secondly, being both a European country and part of a transatlantic community, we should not only keep lines of commerce, of cooperation and communication open, but we should in fact reinforce them. Even if Washington becomes more protectionist in the coming years, we must bear in mind that the EU is a good and important market for US goods and especially services. We should focus on strengthening the connectivity between the two sides of the Atlantic, either through submarine cables or investing in general and in all domains of cybersecurity. We need to identify partners in the south of the Atlantic and to work with them. The same goes for other parts of the world such as India. In this sense, it is generally good advice to “diversify”.
Thirdly, EU member states need to think about the answer to the question of “strategic autonomy”. In matters of choice, we should not be so naïve as to think, as some do, that “equidistance” between the US and China is possible. In my opinion, it is not even desirable.
In a nutshell, it is in the national interest of countries to develop, extend and “diversify” their foreign relations whilst reinforcing their transatlantic and European identities.
